(Click here to return to 'Database of Stance Papers' Menu)

The Twilight of National Sovereignty
by Lord Archer of Sandwell

The United Nations Charter began with the words “We the peoples”, and Article 3 and 4 provided that its members should be states. The underlying assumption appeared to be that the words “nation”, “people” and “state” were interchangeable. To challenge that assumption may appear to be playing at word games, equivalent to doing The Times crossword. But since language is the vehicle by which we formulate and communicate our thinking, words have always been invested with a power, and certainly a life, of their own.

The argument which I want to advance today is that those who drafted the Charter did so on the assumption that the wellbeing and the integrity of a people, or of a nation, is equivalent to the integrity and wellbeing of the specific state to which it is attached on a one-to-one basis. I want to go on to argue that the proposition was never wholly true, and that it is becoming increasingly remote from the real world.

Historically the word “people”, or its counterparts “populus”, “volk”, “narod” has been used to refer to any group of individuals with sufficient characteristics in common to give point to a collective reference. In the early mediaeval period the aristocrats of England and France shared a common language, common pursuits, and frequently common friendships. The inclusion of the word in the Charter was presumably intended in the first instance to imply that the project was not just a tool of the politicians, but represented a genuine reflection of where real people thought their interests lay.

“Nation” is a more recent arrival. The word was probably in use centuries ago, but nationalism, the idea that the word represented something important, is not much earlier than the nineteenth century. A nation is a group whose members can communicate, so that a common language may be important. A shared history, real or imagined, is a weighty factor. It signified a group who were seen as related by blood, the myth of the common ancestor. One clear lesson emerges: the word “nation” is used to emphasize differences. It is what makes “us” different from “Them”. It is why we are loyal to our tribe.

Is it then possible that the title the “United Nations” was an attempt to suggest that nationhood was now to be a factor in marking out the interests which people have in common, the unity of the earth which, despite our differences, we all share, and the mutual enrichment from its cultural diversity? Globalism is accused by xenophobes of submerging local cultures, of stifling local customs, and turning us all into grey mongrels, introducing French berets and German lederhosen into the historic villages of Warwickshire. In fact, it is only in a world made safe by global peace and co-operation that quiet local communities can flourish and practice their chosen ways of life.

But the state tolerates no rival centre of power. Until the Renaissance there were usually alternative controls. In much of Europe, kings tussled to wrest a share of power in their kingdoms from the Emperor. The Church reached across local boundaries to engage in a seesaw with the secular authorities. Dynasties like the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons opposed the ties of dynastic loyalties to the emergent nationhood of territorial regions. So was born the state. Pride in one’s national history, national culture and national symbols was reflected in a corresponding antipathy to the national loyalties of others. The sovereignty of a state within its own geographical boundaries was, and is, like the spray of the skunk and the urine of the wolf, a warning to those outside not to interfere in the affairs of the family.

In 1945 many people were longing for their freedom from Nazi domination, or from colonial control. They cultivated their nationhood, and were intensely jealous of their statehood. Article 2 of the Charter 2 begins: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members”. For a state to complain that complying with its Charter obligations is an assault upon its sovereignty is like an individual arguing that living within a legal system is curtailing his freedom. Of course it is, but in a sane world it is a limitation cheerfully assumed because the total deal is better than the alternative.

Pausing, then, at the inception of the United Nations, the vision was of a world hungry for peace, for a greater measure of justice in sharing the world’s resources, and for the benefits of a legal order which would regulate the dealings of states with one another and with individuals. But that vision was seen through spectacles controlled by state governments, and the lenses were to remain firmly in their hands Even at the beginning, the concept of state sovereignty contained the seeds of its own dilution. The states sought to keep the peoples firmly in their place, but peoples tend to oganize themselves into NGOs. And NGOs frequently possess not only an enthusiasm, but an expertise, which equals, and sometimes exceeds, that of the state bureaucracies. Perhaps even more importantly, they could stir up uncomfortable questions for governments back home. From an early date they were allowed to attend meetings of the General Assembly, its organs and its agencies, to listen respectfully, but also to haunt the verges and lobby delegations.

The assumption in 1945, that it is a simple task to define the word “state”, and to recognize a state whence we see it, is equally questionable. For those who prefer neat categories, the concept of a federation provides a difficulty. The very name “the United States of America” implies that a number of states have agreed to surrender a portion of their sovereignty and to be represented internationally for most purposes by the federal government.

I want to demonstrate one further proposition, that events since 1945 have rendered national sovereignty an even less adequate tool for confronting the third Millennium. It was never the case that events within the territory of a nation state could safely be ignored by the rest of the world. If a state was seen to be preparing for war, that was always likely to disturb the sleep of its neighbours. So armaments limitation has long been a legitimate concern of the international community.

Enforcing law and order is a responsibility which can no longer be left to nation states acting alone. If, hopefully, there comes a time when common sense prevails, and states agree to renounce the possession of all major armaments, it will be necessary to ensure that someone has power to react against a rogue state, or a terrorist group, which resorts to such weapons. The world will need to establish an international authority, in whom there is general confidence, whose function will be to control the remaining weapons of law enforcement. The suggestion is not as novel as it may sound. In the fourteenth century, the major barons in England were reluctant to renounce their right to organize private military forces and build castles, because each was afraid that a glimmer of weakness would attract unwelcome attention from his neighbours. But when the central government showed itself capable of monopolizing serious force, they became reconciled to disarming themselves and looking to the government to protect them from one another.

The states of the American Federation renounced their resort to war, and committed their military resources to the Federal Government, but they do not perceive themselves as rendered powerless by the process.

Those who commit crimes against humanity should not be permitted to shelter behind the sovereignty of their nation state.That principle was established at Nuremberg. It has been reiterated in Bosnia and in East Timor, and in the arguments centred on General Pinochet. Last year in Rome a conference adopted a Statute to establish an International Criminal Court. Its final form represented an element of horse trading, as each national government calculated what it stood to lose by depositing some of it sovereignty into the hat. But it has the capacity to deter the kind of atrocities which we have seen in the past eighteen months. The United Kingdom Government, to its great credit, played a leading part in securing the passing of the Statute, and in heading off some of the attempts to render it ineffective.

A drug may be produced in Afghanistan, despatched to Holland via Pakistan or Iran, and destroy a life in Britain. We are not enjoying success in combating drug trafficking on anything like the scale which is required. Certainly there is now a high degree of international co-operation, but national sovereignty still interposes elements of protocol which impose on the investigators a handicap not shared by the traffickers. Pollution does not stop and show its passport at state frontiers. When we eat fish from the north Atlantic or the Arctic oceans, we risk eating what someone in North America put down the sink six weeks ago.

I would hate to be misunderstood. This is not a plea for the abolition of the nation state. Subsidiarity is not a bad principle, if we treat it as a useful guide and not a taboo. And we will need to devise mechanisms at each level to ensure that collective decisions are not wrecked by those who are selfish or those who are mad. In that hierarchy the nation state has a place. A place, but not a monopoly.

At the global level the present structures of the United Nations are slender indeed to carry such a heavy and a growing burden. We may need to build into the decision-making process a chamber representing a direct link between peoples and the organization, and not mediated through their sates. The purpose of the whole exercise is to accord security, justice and a decent life to peoples. The rights which an institution may claim, and the barriers which it may erect, must be judged by the contribution which they make to that process. That is the purpose of international law, and the United Nations, and nation states.

Editor : This is a shortened version of a speech given to London Region U.N.A. last October

(Click here to return to 'Database of Stance Papers' Menu)